A quick way of spotting the new intellectual climate in Italy is via a comparison of a survey article on contemporary Italian philosophy, "Orientamenti della Filosofia Contemporanea in Italia," published by Francesco Orestano practically on the eve of the last war, with a very recent volume of essays entitled La mia prospettiva filosofica. The latter contains a dozen Confessiones Fidei, ten of which are written by present-day Italian thinkers, the other two being by Jules Chaix-Ruy and Louis Lavelle (...) of France. (shrink)

To avoid this blunt and embarrassing alternative seems to be the goal of much recent philosophy--and especially of continental European thought. It becomes apparent at once that these problems cannot be separated from our experience and interpretation of process and duration, of time and change, and of our place within them. It is this consideration, recognized as the very heart of the matter, to which Professor Chaix-Ruy has turned his attention. He finds his central problem to be an ancient (...) and recurring one, and he pays as much attention to Augustine and Pascal as to Bergson and Einstein. There results a panorama of Western thought apprehended from an unusual point of view. The detailed studies included are often fresh and penetrating and the whole argument is of absorbing interest. We may introduce this argument by indicating that at one point, although at one point only, Chaix-Ruy agrees completely with Sartre: the relation of essence to existence in human life is a unique one, quite different from that to be found elsewhere among non-human or sub-human beings. This contrast involves a description of man's relation to time and to change. Human nature is subject to change, or better, man subjects himself to change. "Chez nous l'essence est in fieri". We are reminded of Sartre's "Faire et en faisant se faire," although, as we shall soon see, we need not think of the initiative as lying wholly with our existence, as opposed to our essence. After all, an existence capable of transforming essence must have a structure of its own and a modus operandi. Even the freest choice is "structured." This would seem to be true even if our creative self-realization in some way embraces or contains nonbeing. (shrink)

Jules Janssens a construit une œuvre importante, qui, pour de nombreux chercheurs, a ouvert des perspectives de recherches nouvelles et fécondes. Ses travaux ont fait date. Ils portent principalement sur la philosophie d'Avicenne, ses sources, ses rapports avec la pensée musulmane, son influence sur la théologie ash'arite (al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) et sa réception dans le monde latin. Pour lui rendre hommage, quatorze collègues et amis de renommée internationale se sont réunis pour poursuivre ses réflexions sur ces thèmes. L'ouvrage (...) qui en est issu offre un état des lieux de la recherche contemporaine sur Avicenne et sa postérité arabo-latine. (shrink)

The first part of this book is a translation of a philosophical work by the Breton philosopher Jules Lequyer, which explores questions of divine justice and human equality. The second part is a biography of Lequyer by Donald Wayne Viney, based on Prosper Hemon's life of Lequyer, and other material.

Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...) time in ways that attributions of blameworthiness are not. There are a number of ways in which reactive emotion accounts might attempt to accommodate the moral significance of time, however. We consider the most important of these, but ultimately find them wanting. Accordingly, we conclude that the prospects for the reactive emotion accounts are bleak. Our argument, if successful, has a range of implications for legal theory, most importantly in providing a novel moral basis for statutes of limitations and in shedding light on new avenues in the theory of criminal law generally. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...) blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive. (shrink)